mac_partition(4)

NAME

mac_partition - process partition policy

SYNOPSIS

To compile the process partition policy  into  your  kernel,
place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:
      options MAC
      options MAC_PARTITION
Alternately,  to  load  the process partition module at boot
time, place the
following line in your kernel configuration file:
      options MAC
and in loader.conf(5):
      mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION

The mac_partition policy module implements a process parti

tion policy,
which allows administrators to place running processes into
``partitions'', based on their numeric process partition

(specified in
the process's MAC label). Processes with a specified parti

tion can only
see processes that are in the same partition. If no parti

tion is specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the

system (subject
to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man

page). No provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions are

available.

Label Format

Partition labels take on the following format:

partition/value

Where value can be any integer value or ``none''. For exam

ple:

partition/1
partition/20
partition/none

SEE ALSO

mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4),

mac_lomac(4),
mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4),

mac_seeotheruids(4),
mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY

The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD

5.0 and was
developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS

This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Net

work Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associ

ates Inc.
under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as

part of the
DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS

See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.

The TrustedBSD
MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the

containment of
the root user, not all attack channels are currently pro

tected by entry
point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be

relied on,
in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged us

er.

BSD December 9, 2002

BSD